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A PALACE FOR A PEPPERCORN: A POST-BFP PROPOSAL
TO RESURRECT SECTION 548(A)(2)(A)
I. INTRODUCTION
As counsel for Octopus National Bank ("ONB"), you must prepare a
bidding strategy for an upcoming mortgage foreclosure. The mortgaged
property is a piece of commercial real estate upon which a debtor operates
a parking garage. The property's fair market value is one million dollars.
The garage is the debtor's sole asset, and foreclosure will render the debtor
bankrupt. What should ONB bid in order to protect its interest in the
property?'
Prior to the 1994 Supreme Court decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp.,2 a foreclosing lender, or mortgagee,3 would bid less than seventy
percent of the fair market value of the property. Seventy percent of the fair
market value was a judicial benchmark4 that satisfied the Bankruptcy Code
("the Code") requirement that all involuntary transfers of assets during the
year preceding the bankruptcy filing receive "reasonably equivalent
value."5
1. The hypothetical is loosely modeled after In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th
Cir. 1985). In Winshall Settlor's Trust, the Sixth Circuit allowed the creditor bank to foreclose on
commercial real estate valued between $1 and $1.8 million for a purchase price of $400,000. Id. at
1138.
2. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
3. A mortgagee is a "[p]erson that takes or receives a mortgage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1012 (6th ed. 1990). The mortgagor is "[o]ne who, having all or some part of title to property, by
written instrument pledges that property for some particular purpose such as security for a debt." Id.
4. The Court in Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. adopted the rule that purchasers at
foreclosure sales must pay at least 70 percent of the property's fair market value. 460 F. Supp. 52, 54
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the judicial
development of the Durrett Rule, see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
In the dissenting opinion to BFP, Justice Souter commented on the Durrett Rule: "To the extent,
moreover, that Durrett is said to have announced a 'rule,' it is better understood as recognizing a 'safe
harbor' or affirmative defense for bidding mortgagees or other transferees who paid 70% or more of
a property's appraised value at the time of the sale." BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1773.
5. The "reasonably equivalent value" requirement in I 1 U.S.C. § 548(a) provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation
incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of
the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or
1747
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Codified in § 548(a)(2)(A) of the Code,6 the requirement that transfers
yield "reasonably equivalent value 7 is used to preserve the property of the
bankruptcy estate.8 Section 548(a)(2)(A) empowers the trustee in bankrupt-
cy ("TIB")9 to set aside ° pre-filing transfers' exchanged for less than
obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation....
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1993).
7. For a discussion of § 548(a)(2), see Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as
Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933 (1985).
Commenting on the purpose of § 548(a)(2), Professor Ehrlich states:
From a bankruptcy perspective, however, a foreclosure sale on the eve of bankruptcy, at
which the debtor's interest is sold for a fraction of its true market value, constitutes an
estate-depleting windfall to the purchaser at the expense of the debtor's creditors. The long
history of fraudulent conveyance provisions strongly support an interpretation of section
548(a)(2) that permits the trustee to recapture such a loss.
Id. at 935-36. The authors of the 1973 Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States also commented on the purpose of the fraudulent conveyance provision:
Without such provisions, the estate available for distribution to creditors in the bankruptcy
proceedings could be seriously depleted (or perhaps eliminated) by the transfer of most or all
of the assets to favored creditors or to friends or relatives or simply to those creditors who
exert the most pressure on the debtor.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1973) (emphasis added). Allowing over-zealous creditors estate depleting wind
falls is inconsistent with the Code's goal to ensure equitable distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy
estate. See 3 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTIcE § 12.22, at 74-77 (6th ed. 1994)
(discussing the basic concept of equal treatment of creditors); see also Robert F. Finke et al., Undoing
the Excesses of the 1980s: Avoidance Actions and Equitable Subordination, C880 ALI-ABA 197, *348
(1994), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL database (noting "the Bankruptcy Code's purpose in n fair
and equitable distribution among creditors."). Thus, § 548(a)(2) provides a tool by which the TIB may
prevent such windfalls and preserve the assets of the estate. See Ehrlich, supra, at 935-36.
8. In their treatise on bankruptcy, Professors Warren and Westerbrook artfully explain the concept
of the "bankruptcy estate:"
At the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed (voluntary or involuntary) an "estate" is created
by operation of law, just as if a new corporation had been established or a new trust created.
The most direct analogy is with the decedent's estate created by law upon someone's death.
Bankruptcy is in a sense a financial demise, which creates an estate consisting of all the
interests in property previously owned by the debtor.
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. NVESTERBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 200 (2d ed.
1991).
9. The TIB is the "person in whom the property of a debtor is vested in trust for the creditors."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1514 (6th ed. 1990).
10. "Set aside" is a bankruptcy term of art meaning "[t]o reverse, vacate, cancel, annul, or revoke
ajudgment, order, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (6th ed. 1990). Under § 550 of the Code, the
TIB "may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or... the value of such
property" that is voidable under § 548. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1993).
Section 544 authorizes TIBs to set aside such voidable transfers and allows the TIB to "avoid any
transfer... incurred by the debtor that is voidable" and to "avoid any transfer of an interest of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/8
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reasonably equivalent value and to bring the transferred assets back into the
bankruptcy estate. This ensures that all creditors will benefit from the
debtor's assets.
In bankruptcy parlance, transfers for less than reasonably equivalent
value under § 548(a)(2)(A) are termed "fraudulent conveyances."12
Although a transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value may not rise
to the level of actual fraudulent conduct, the lack of reasonably equivalent
value triggers a presumption of fraud, under which the debtor's actual
intent is irrelevant." Because transfers exchanged for less than reasonably
equivalent value within one year of the bankruptcy filing are constructively
fraudulent conveyances, 14 § 548(a)(2)(A) allows the TIB to set aside such
debtor in property... that is voidable." I 1 U.S.C. § 544(a), (b) (1993). Referred to as the "Strong Arm
Clause," § 544 allows the TIB to "undo prebankruptcy transactions between the debtor and certain
creditors, to the benefit of all unsecured creditors." WARREN & WESTERBROOK, supra note 8, at 498
(2d ed. 1991). This Note argues that BFP improperly carves out a foreclosure sale exception to the TIB
avoidance powers. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
11. Because the term "transfer," defined in II U.S.C. § 10 1(54), specifically includes involuntary
dispositions of property, parties may challenge foreclosure sales under § 548. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)
(1993). Before Congress amended the Code in 1984 to include this language, this issue was hotly
debated. For a discussion of the legal debate surrounding the time of transfer, see infra note 47.
12. Section 548 of the Code is labeled "Fraudulent transfers and obligations" and is commonly
referred to as the fraudulent conveyance provision of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1993). However, only
subsection (1) of this provision is intended to reach actual fraudulent conduct. See supra note 5.
Subsection 548(a)(2)(A) does not regulate actual fraudulent conduct. Rather, it establishes a "federal
basis-independent of state law-for setting aside a foreclosure sale," regardless of the debtor's intent or
good faith. WARREN & WESTERBROOK, supra note 8, at 138-40, discusses fraudulent conveyance law.
Thus, § 548(a)(2)(A) reaches constructively fraudulent conduct and allows the TIB to set aside a transfer
for less than reasonably equivalent value regardless of the debtor's intent.
The four elements of a constructively fraudulent conveyance are: "(1) [a] transfer of an interest of
the debtor (2) within one year of the date of filing of the petition (3) for less than reasonably equivalent
value (4) while the debtor was insolvent, or rendering him insolvent." In re Verna, 58 B.R. 246, 248
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). This Note limits discussion to the issue of reasonably equivalent value.
13. But cf. Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 781-84
(1984) (criticizing the application of fraudulent conveyance law to nonbankruptcy foreclosure rules
which do not entail "debtor misbehavior" and thus are the "wrong vehicle" for addressing such
transfers).
14. In their discussion of fraudulent conveyance law, Warren and Westerbrook comment on the
distinction between actual fraudulent intent and constructive fraud:
The most important aspect of the original 1915 statute [the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act] was that it codified in fraudulent conveyance law a concept usually called "constructive
fraud" or "presumptive fraud." Both terms are misnomers because the new concept permitted
a creditor to avoid-to set aside-a transfer even though the debtor was entirely innocent of
any fraudulent intent. The statute defined circumstances in which the transfer was regarded
as unfairly disadvantageous to the debtor's creditors, regardless of intent. Such a transfer
could be avoided without any showing of fraud, constructive or otherwise, so there was no
need for any "presumption" and there was nothing to rebut.
WARREN & WESTERBROOK, supra note 8, at 139. For a discussion of the UFCA's adoption, see infra
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transfers just as if the debtor had engaged in actual fraud.
Before BFP, debtors or TIBs could move the bankruptcy court to review
foreclosure sale transfers that yielded inadequate value and depleted the
bankruptcy estate. 5 However, under BFP, bankruptcy courts may no
longer review or set aside such transfers.'6 The price paid at a
regularly-conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale is presumed to be the
reasonably equivalent value.' 7
Thus, BFP allows mortgage lenders such as ONB to bid any amount so
long as they comply with state foreclosure law." BFP represents a huge
victory for mortgage lenders. So long as lenders follow the state process for
properly conducting foreclosure sales, BFP allows them to repossess
collateral by bidding the mortgage balance regardless of the fair market
value of the property. BFP allows mortgagees to purchase valuable real
estate for mere pocket change, or for a "peppercorn" as Justice Souter so
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
15. These parties could make such a motion pursuant to § 550 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 550
(1993). For a discussion of § 550, see supra note 10.
16. For a discussion of BFP and the irrebuttable presumption rule, see infra part III.
17. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1758.
18. The state foreclosure sale process is inadequate and shocking. One commentator criticized the
system:
[T]he state-mandated procedure is intrinsically defective and has caused imperfect market
results ... .In an age of computer data accessibility, sophisticated and widespread brokerage
listing services, available credit financing, easily accessible title insurance, and reliable escrow
companies, state-foreclosure laws are woefully inadequate, occasionally shocking, and in
drastic need of upgrading.
Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 961-62.
The foreclosure process does not yield equitable results. One study concluded that "[iln 99.3% of
'public' sales, the mortgagee is the buyer." William C. Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure,
14 BUS. LAW. 132, 135 (1958). Subsequent studies reinforce these statistics. Steven Wechsler, Through
the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of
Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 850, 896 (1985) (concluding that
judicial foreclosures are a "meaningless charade" in which the mortgagee forecloses, purchases the
property at the sale and resells it at a significant profit).
Frequently, mortgagees are the only bidders at foreclosure sales because the process discourages
third-party bidders. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE S. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAWv 622-26 (3d.
ed. 1994). Third parties are reluctant bidders because at a foreclosure sale they must pay in cash.
However, mortgagees receive a credit for the outstanding mortgage debt and thus do not have to pay
this amount in cash. Id. at 623. Additionally, foreclosure statutes only require limited notice and sale
publication. Most often, such notice is published in newspapers with low circulation. Id. Further, state
foreclosure laws do not provide third-party purchasers with a warranty of good title. Id. Finally, third-
party purchasers are rarely given an opportunity to physically inspect the property. Id. Either the debtor
in possession refuses access or the foreclosing mortgagee discourages such access by limiting the
information available on the property. Id. See also UNIF. LAND TRANS. AcT, 13 U.L.A. §§ 3-501 to
3-513 (setting forth a model for state foreclosure law).
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artfully termed it in his dissent to BFP.19
The difficulty with the irrebuttable presumption rule becomes apparent
when applied to our hypothetical. Without any standard for reasonably
equivalent value or fear of a subsequent set aside,20 ONB has no incentive
to bid more than the outstanding balance of the mortgage. If the balance
was $250,000, ONB's bid would represent only one quarter of the
property's fair market value. Thus, ONB would satisfy its mortgage, deplete
the bankruptcy estate of seventy-five percent of the debtor's equity in the
property, and gain a windfall profit upon resale of the property.2 Because
19. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1767. Justice Souter summarizes the majority's opinion saying, "[t]oday
the Court holds that by the terms of the Bankruptcy Code Congress intended a peppercorn paid at a
noncollusive and procedurally regular foreclosure sale to be treated as the 'reasonabl[e] equivalent' of
the value of a California beachfront estate." Id.
Although technically a "peppercorn" is a "dried berry of Black Pepper," The Oxford English
Dictionary explains that the term is also used colloquially to connote a "very small, insignificant[, or]
trivial" amount of rent or payment for an interest in real estate. 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
510 (2d ed. 1989).
20. Generally, under state law, foreclosure sales may not be challenged for "mere inadequacy of
price." See Central Nat'l Bank v. Bell, 5 Cal.2d 324, 328 (Cal. 1936). To challenge foreclosure sales,
the price received must be so low as to "shock the conscience." Gottlieb v. MeArdle, 580 F. Supp.
1523, 1525 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (citing United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968)); Golden
v. Tomiyasu, 387 P.2d 989, 992 (Nev. 1963). "Reasonably equivalent value" clearly connotes a higher
threshold of value than the state standard. The discrepancy between these two standards is
irreconcilable.
Bankruptcy law supplements the state law process to secure the assets of the bankruptcy estate. The
inadequacy of the foreclosure system necessitates § 548. On this issue, Professor Lynn LoPucki
concluded that sales procedures used by bankruptcy courts are "vastly superior to those employed in
the state remedies subsystem .... In bankruptcy sales it is usual to receive more than 75 percent of
the appraised value of the property." Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Banklruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 320-21 & n.52 (1982).
This Note acknowledges that reforming state foreclosure law is essential. However, this Note does
not attempt to duplicate existing reform proposals. For a sample of such proposals, see Michael H.
Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489 (1991); Michael L.
Walcott, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales As Fraudulent Transfers Under Section 548(a) of the
Banlkruptcy Code: An Impetus to Changing State Foreclosure Procedures, 66 NEB. L. REV. 383 (1987).
Instead, this Note proposes that Congress must amend § 548 to allow bankruptcy courts to review
the state foreclosure process to ensure that foreclosure sale prices are reasonably equivalent to fair
market value.
21. Justice Souter predicted similar bidding strategies in his dissent in BFP:
At a typical foreclosure sale, a mortgagee has no incentive to bid any more than the amount
of the indebtedness, since any "surplus" would be turned over to the debtor (or junior
lienholder), and, in some states it can even be advantageous for the creditor to bid less and
seek a deficiency judgement. And where property is obviously worth more than the amount
of the indebtedness, the lending mortgagee's interests are served best if the foreclosure sale
is poorly attended; then, the lender is more likely to take the property by bidding the amount
of the indebtedness, retaining for itself any profits from resale.
BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1775 (citations omitted).
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a bankruptcy court would be powerless to review the sale and recapture the
property, BFP legalizes constructively fraudulent conveyances.
This Note assesses BFP's impact on the balance of power between
federal bankruptcy courts and state foreclosure law. Part II analyzes the
historical development of bankruptcy law as a vehicle to set aside
foreclosure sales. Part III analyzes and critiques BFP. Part IV proposes
amending the Code to allow bankruptcy courts to review constructively
fraudulent transfers. Alternatively, Part IV proposes a narrow judicial
interpretation of BFP. Finally, Part V concludes that the use of fraudulent
conveyance law to set aside state foreclosure sales complements federal
bankruptcy policy.
II. BACKGROUND ON SECTION 548 CONFLICT
Members of the legal community have hotly contested the use of
fraudulent conveyance law to set aside foreclosure sales that transfer
property for less than "reasonably equivalent value."'22 Historically,
lawyers used fraudulent conveyance law to prevent debtors from transfer-
ring assets with the "intent to hinder, delay or defraud" their creditors.23
Because actual intent is difficult to prove, courts developed "badges of
fraud" or factual settings that were presumptively fraudulent.2"
Supplementing federal bankruptcy law, state statutes constitute the
primary source of fraudulent conveyance law. State statutes developed
simultaneously with the federal provisions and reflect similar policy
considerations. In 1918, constructive fraud was codified in the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA") The Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform Laws adopted the UFCA to provide a model for state
22. "Reasonably equivalent value" is defined in II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1993). For the full text of
§ 548, see supra note 5.
23. This language originated in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570), cited in BFP,
114 S. Ct. at 1763. The Statute of 13 Elizabeth allowed "covinous and fraudulent" transfers made with
the intent to "delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others" to be set aside. Id.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 adopted the intent language in the Elizabethan statute, and the language
remained unchanged for the next forty years. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 98-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
24. Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber, 1601) (invalidating gift made
with the "mark of fraud" as a fraudulent conveyance), cited in WARREN & WESTERBROOK, supra note
8, at 137-38.
25. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1975) [hereinafter U.F.C.A.].
[VOL. 73:1747
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fraudulent conveyance statutes.26 The UFCA grants creditors standing to
challenge debtor conveyances incurred without "fair consideration."
2 7
Over the next sixty years, Congress incorporated the UFCA's construc-
tive fraud standards into the federal Bankruptcy Code. In 1938, Congress
enacted the Chandler Act, removing the intent requirement from the section
on fraudulent conveyances and adopting the UFCA's "fair consideration"
language." Ultimately, the 1978 Bankruptcy Act removed the "good
faith" transfer requirement.29 These amendments removed the historical
limits on fraudulent conveyance law by allowing transfers to be set aside
for constructive fraud.3" The adoption of the presumptive fraud provision
placed foreclosure sales within the reach of the TIB's avoidance powers.3'
Through these amendments, Congress shifted the focus from the debtor's
mental state to the transfer's impact upon creditors and the bankruptcy
estate.32 However, Congress did not remove the term "fraudulent." The
use of fraudulent conveyance law to regulate non-fraudulent behavior has
created a confusing paradox that has sparked scholarly and judicial
criticism.1 3
26. See Kevin J. Carey, Protecting Assets While Avoiding Fraudulent Conveyances, C950
ALI-ABA 691, 693-94 (1994), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database; Note, Good Faith and
Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARv. L. REv. 495, 496 (1983).
27. U.F.C.A., supra note 25, §§ 3, 4, at 448-49, 474.
28. The Chandler Act removed the intent requirement and allowed transfers made for less than
"fair consideration" to be set aside regardless of the debtor's state of mind. Chandler Act § 67(d)
(current version at I 1 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)) (original at Bankruptcy Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §
67d(2)(a), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976)) (repealed 1978)). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937); BFP, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1769 n.5 (1994) (discussing the
impact of the Chandler Act).
29. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)); H.R. REPI No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 5971.
30. For a discussion of the distinction between actual fraudulent intent and constructive fraud, see
supra notes 12, 14.
31. Discussing the impact of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
("BAFJA"), Justice Souter addressed his apprehension in the dissenting opinion saying, "whether or not
one believes (as the majority seemingly does not) that foreclosure sales rightfully belong within the
historic domain of 'fraudulent conveyance' law, that is exactly where Congress has not put them, and
our duty is to give effect to these new amendments along with every other clause of the Bankruptcy
Code." BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1770 (citations omitted). See also Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 463(a), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984).
32. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1769 n.5 (discussing the impact of the Chandler Act and the 1978
Bankruptcy Amendments).
33. Discussing this paradox, Judge Schermer ofthe United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri argued that if § 548(a)(2) were extracted from § 548(a) and renamed "The Estate
Preservation Provision," the distinction between fraudulent transfers, prohibited under 548(a)(1), and
Washington University Open Scholarship
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After the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, the courts divided over the application
of fraudulent transfer law to foreclosure sales. The first case to apply
fraudulent transfer law to foreclosure sales was Durrett v. Washington
National Insurance Co.34 In Durrett, a case brought under the 1978
version of the Code,35 the Chapter XI debtor in possession petitioned the
court to set aside or void a nonjudicial property foreclosure for 57.7 percent
of the fair market value.36 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
foreclosure price paid did not constitute a "fair equivalent" for the transfer
of the property.37
Courts interpreting Durrett have focused on the seventy percent dictum,
rather than the whole opinion. The Durrett court noted that it was, "unable
to locate a decision of any district or appellate court dealing only with a
transfer of real property as the subject of attack under section 67(d) of the
Act, which has approved the transfer for less than 70 percent of the market
value of the property."'38 Courts and mortgage lenders interpreted this
language as a mandate of the "Seventy Percent Rule" or "Durrett Rule,"
which requires that mortgagees bid seventy percent of the fair market
transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value, prohibited under § 548(a)(2)(A), would be apparent.
Interview with the Hon. Barry S. Schermer, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in St. Louis, Mo. (Oct. 31, 1994).
34. 460 F. Supp. 52 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
In BFP, Justice Scalia commented on the novelty of the Durrett decision saying, "[flraudulent
transfer law and foreclosure law enjoyed over 400 years of peaceful coexistence in Anglo-American
jurisprudence until the Fifth Circuit's unprecedented 1980 decision in Durrett." BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1764.
35. The debtor claimed that the price paid was not "fair consideration" or a "fair equivalent" under
section 67(d) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, I 1 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1978). Durrett, 621 F.2d at 202. Section
67(d) provided, in relevant part:
(1) For the purposes of, and exclusively applicable to this subdivision: ...
(e) consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair"
(1) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property is transferred
11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1978), cited in Durrett, 621 F.2d at 202.
36. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203. The fair market value of Durrett's property on January 4, 1977, the
date of the foreclosure sale, was $200,000. Id. Durrett had executed a note in the amount of $180,000
on the property in 1969. Id. at 202. The balance owed to the mortgagee, Washington National Insurance
Company, was $119,278.38. Durrett, 460 F. Supp. 52, 53. The third party purchaser bid $115,400 at
the foreclosure sale. Id.
37. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.
38. Id. This statement is criticized in subsequent case law because the Durrett court cited a single
case as precedent for this bald assertion. Id. The case, Schafer v. Hammond, 456 F.2d 15 (10th Cir.
1972), involved a prepetition conveyance of assets from a debtor corporation to the mother of the
principal stockholder of the debtor corporation. Id. at 16.
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value.39 Despite criticism that it "cast a cloud upon mortgages and deeds
of trust" which would "inhibit a purchaser other than the mortgagee from
buying at foreclosure ... [and] depress further the prices of foreclosure
sales,"4 the Durrett Rule set the industry standard for foreclosure bidding
in the Fifth Circuit until BFP.4
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Durrett Rule in
Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.42 The Madrid court set forth the
"Irrebuttable Presumption Rule" or "Madrid Rule," which presumes that,
so long as the sale is noncollusive and regularly conducted, the foreclosure
price constitutes "reasonably equivalent value."'43 In Madrid, a Chapter 11
39. See, e.g., In re Cole, 81 B.R. 326, 331 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (avoiding foreclosure sale
yielding between 47.7 and 65.1% of the fair market value); In reNew YorketownAssocs., 40 B.R. 701,
706-07 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (avoiding forced sale of commercial realty with fair market value in
excess of $2 million for bid price of $297,000); In re Berge, 33 B.R. 642, 649-50 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1983) (avoiding strict foreclosure of farm for 44.9% of the $2,555,000.00 market value); In re Wheeler,
34 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (avoiding forced sale of debtor's residence for 62.7% of fair
market value); hi re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434, 448-49 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (avoiding forced sale of
debtor's residence for 21% of fair market value); In re Ocean Dev. of America, Inc., 22 B.R. 834, 835-
37 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (avoiding fraudulent transfer on half-interest in Palm Beach mansion to
debtor's girlfriend for 65% of the fair market value); In re Coleman, 21 B.R. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1982) (avoiding forced sale of debtor's residence for 28% of fair market value); In re Thompson,
18 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (upholding forced sale of debtor's residence for 80.8% of the
fair market value).
40. Justice Clark penned this commonly cited critique in the dissenting opinion in Abramson v.
Lakewood Bank and Trust, 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). In Abramson, the Fifth Circuit employed
the Durrett rationale and held that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was a "transfer" within the Bankruptcy
Code. Further, the court determined that a sale could be set aside as fraudulent if it was made without
fair consideration. Id. at 547. Many subsequent foreclosure sale opinions and bankruptcy treatises have
cited Justice Clark's famous "cloud" dissent:
By our decision here and in Durrett we cast a cloud upon mortgages and trust deeds.
Foreclosure within twelve months before a filing creates a sale voidable by a trustee in
bankruptcy if the public sale did not bring a "fair consideration"... . The cloud created over
mortgages and trust deeds by making foreclosure sales subject to being voided by a
bankruptcy trustee will naturally inhibit a purchaser other than the mortgagee from buying at
foreclosure. This tends to depress further the prices of the foreclosure sales and thus increase
the potential size of the deficiency in each foreclosure in all six states comprising this circuit.
It is interesting to me that Durrett is the first case treating this problem-after 90 years
of bankruptcy law and mortgages of a time greater than the memory of man. It again
establishes what an imaginative lawyer can do when he adds persuasion.
Id. at 550.
41. For a discussion of case law following Durrett, see supra note 39.
42. 10 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981), rev'd, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981), affd, 725 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
43. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199-1203. Madrid represents policy driven legal interpretation. In
granting an irrebuttable presumption of validity to the price paid at a foreclosure sale, the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel explained:
We decline to follow Durrett's 70% fair market value rule for the reason that a regularly
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debtor sought to rescind a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of her beachfront
property." At the foreclosure sale, the bona fide purchaser bought the
house for between sixty-four and sixty-seven percent of the fair market
value.4"
The court in Madrid never resolved whether the sale price constituted
reasonably equivalent value. 6 Instead, the court held that because the
foreclosure sale did not constitute a "transfer" under § 548(a), the court did
not need to reach the issue of reasonably equivalent value.47 Despite this
holding, the Ninth Circuit addressed the debate surrounding "reasonably
equivalent value" in dicta.
In Madrid, the majority of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected the
Durrett court's reasoning," fearing the adverse effect of such a rule on
commercial and real estate law.49 The majority criticized the Durrett Rule
conducted sale open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of
private transfers to relatives and favorites.
Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426-27.
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id. at 424, 429 n.3. The property's fair market value was estimated between $380,000 and
$400,000. Madrid, 10 B.R. at 798. At the time of the January 9, 1981 foreclosure sale, the debtor owed
$175,000 on the first deed of trust and $80,224.39 on the second deed of trust. Id. at 797. The third-
party purchaser bought the property for $256,000. Id.
46. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1197.
47. Id. at 1199. The court concluded:
[T]he foreclosure sale was not a transfer under § 548(a), and [we] do not decide whether the
amount paid at foreclosure was a reasonably equivalent value.... [Tihe transfer of Madrid's
property interest under § 548(a)(2)(A) occurred at the time the second deed of trust was
perfected under Nevada law. That transfer was carried out more than one year prior to filing
of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, the transfer was not voidable as a § 548(a)(2)(A) fraudulent
conveyance.
Id. This argument is erroneous. Prior to Congress' 1984 amendment to § 101, defining transfers to
include involuntary dispositions, critics debated whether or not a foreclosure sale constituted a transfer.
Alden, supra note 17, at 1608-13. Concluding that foreclosures were not transfers, the Ninth Circuit
based its determination on the "One Transfer Rule." Id. at 1609 (citing In re Also, 14 B.L 982 (Bankr.
D. Alaska 1981)). The "One Transfer Rule" posits that the date of the foreclosure should relate back
to the date of the underlying security interest. In re Also, 14 B.R. at 986. Thus, for purposes of § 548,
there is only a single transfer of the property interest. So long as the mortgage agreement occurred
outside the one year avoidance period, the foreclosure sale cannot be challenged. Steven M. Alden, et
al., Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem,
38 Bus. LAW 1605, 1608-13 (1983). See also Robert M. Zinman et al., Fraudulent Transfers According
to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW 977 (1984).
However, following the Madrid decision, Congress amended the definition of transfer, clarifying its
application to foreclosure, sales and implicitly rejecting the "One Transfer Rule." For a discussion of
the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, see infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
48. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1202.
49. However, little or no empirical data has been collected to legitimize this "adverse effect." In
fact, one commentator's empirical study concluded that although Durrett "was expected to wreck havoc
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as inappropriately extending federal bankruptcy law into the domain of
state foreclosure law. The court argued that Durrett's interpretation of
§ 548(a)(2)(A) created a de facto right of redemption." The court
reasoned that a federally-imposed right of redemption contravened state
property law."
Further, the Madrid court feared that such judicial innovation would
"chill participation at foreclosure sales" and inhibit creditors from lending
funds secured by a mortgage or deed of trust.5 2 The Madrid majority
endorsed an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value when
a judicial foreclosure sale is both noncollusive and complies with state
law. 3 Numerous courts, as well as the real estate lending community,
endorsed this policy. 4
Just four months later, in In re Hulm, 5 the Eighth Circuit rejected the
on the mortgage credit markets... the anticipated harms did not materialize ..." Philip Schuchman,
Data On the Durrett Controvers; 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 605, 607 (1987). Professor Schuchman studied
the effects of the Durrett and Madrid decisions on national, Texas, and California mortgage interest
rates and on total mortgage loans created between 1979 and 1985. Id.
50. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1202. Judge Volinn's dissent in the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel Madrid opinion refuted this criticism:
Section 548 transcends the dispute between this debtor and the secured creditor. It brings into
focus the claims of the debtor's other creditors that they have been deprived of recourse to
an asset by an improvident sale. The majority would hold that despite the widespread
differences in law and practices relating to foreclosure, no bankruptcy court may entertain the
factual issue of whether, under § 548, the consideration paid was reasonably equivalent value.
By concluding that a regularly conducted sale in absence of collusion satisfies the "reasonably
equivalent value" test, the majority has excised vital language from § 548 in order to create
an exception to the statute where a forced sale of the debtor's property is involved. There is
nothing in the Code nor its legislative history to suggest that such an exception was intended.
... I would hold that the price paid at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale should be given,
at best, a strong presumption of adequacy.
Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428.
51. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1202.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1203. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e do not add to the arsenal of bankruptcy
powers the right to avoid a nonjudicial, regularly conducted foreclosure sale of real property." Id.
54. See, e.g., In re Ehring, 900 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the impact of the 1984
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act on the Madrid Rule); In re Winshall Settlor's
Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1138-40 (6th Cir. 1985) (refusing to set aside forced sale of commercial realty
for 22 to 40% of the fair market value); In re Kachanizadeh, 108 B.R. 734, 738 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)
(refusing to set aside forced sale of a debtor's residence for 71% of the fair market value); In re Verna,
58 B.R 246, 252 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (refusing to set aside forced sale of a debtor's residence for
44% of the fair market value); In re Ristich, 57 B.R. 568, 580 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (refusing to set
aside forced sale of undeveloped realty for 70.9% of the debtor's equity); In re Upham, 48 B.R. 695,
697 n. I (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to set aside forced sale of a debtor's residence for 71 to 78%
of fair market value).
55. 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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Madrid court's assumption that a regularly conducted foreclosure sale
automatically provided reasonably equivalent value.56 In Hulm, the
foreclosing mortgagee purchased the property, a single-family home, for
$64,443.64 and resold it nine months later for $95,000.17 Thus, the
mortgagee deprived the bankruptcy estate and the unsecured creditors of
$30,556.36.58 Criticizing the Madrid Rule as a policy determination which
Congress alone should address, the court declared that an evidentiary
hearing was necessary to determine reasonably equivalent value. 9
Immediately following the Hulm decision, Congress debated the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
("BAFJA"). ° BAFJA proposed three changes to address the conflict
between the circuits. First, it proposed amending the definition of transfer
in § 101 of the Code to specifically include foreclosure sales.6' By
including foreclosure sales as voidable transfers within the purview of
§ 548,62 Congress accepted Durrett's analysis of the "transfer" issue.
Second, BAFJA proposed that Congress include the language "voluntarily
or involuntarily" in § 548 to emphasize its applicability to foreclosure
sales.63 This would bring involuntary transfers within the TIB's avoidance
56. 738 F.2d at 327. For an interesting discussion of the Hulm decision's impact on the
development of fraudulent transfer law, see Frank W. Koger & Paula C. Acconcia, The Hdn Decision:
A Milestone for Creditors, 91 COM. L. J. 301 (1986).
57. In re Hulm, 45 B.R. 523, 525-26 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
58. Id. at 529. On remand, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota
ordered that the mortgagee, First Federal Savings & Loan, pay the trustee $35,556.36, which represented
"the value of the interest transferred which was not represented in the price bid in by First Federal."
Id.
59. Id. at 327. In support of this assertion, the court explained:
We do not believe that the sale price at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale, although
absent fraud or collusion, can automatically be deemed to provide a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the interest of the debtor transferred within the meaning of section
548(a)....
We are aware of expressed concern that the result we have reached will affect the
strategies of purchasers at judicial foreclosure sales. The Bankruptcy Code provisions are
clear, however, and direct the result we have reached. Hence, policy considerations cannot
affect the outcome in this case, but must be addressed, if at all, by Congress.
Id. (citations omitted).
60. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 463(a),
98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984). The Eighth Circuit decided Hulm on July 5, 1984. Hulm, 45 B.R. at 323.
Congress enacted BAFJA on July 10, 1984, just five days later. For an excellent discussion of BAFJA,
see In re Verna, 58 B.R. 246, 250-51 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
61. Pub. L. No. 98-535; § 463(a), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984). For a discussion of the transfer issue,
see supra note 47.
62. Id.
63. Id. For the current statutory text of § 548, see supra note 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/8
A PALACE FOR A PEPPERCORN
power under § 548 and overrule Madrid. Ultimately, Congress codified
both of these proposals in BAFJA. 6
The third BAFJA proposal adopted the language of the Madrid Rule. The
proposed amendment read, "A secured party or third party purchaser who
obtains title to an interest of the debtor in property pursuant to a good faith
prepetition foreclosure ... takes for reasonably equivalent value."65
However, Congress deleted this provision before enactment.66 Congress
refused to resolve the Madrid/Durrett problem,67 leaving the issue open
to further judicial interpretation.
In the same year, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA")6
to clarify, improve and replace the UFCA.69 The UFTA adopted the
language of § 548, which allowed parties to challenge and set aside
transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value.7" However, the
Commissioners also incorporated the Madrid Rule into the UFTA definition
64. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 463(a), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984).
65. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 360(c) (1983) (proposing the inclusion of this amendment in
§ 548(d)(2)). See also Verna, 58 B.R. at 250.
66. However, the provision was not deleted before a lengthy debate. In 1984, Senators Robert Dole
(R. Kan.) and Dennis DeConcini (R. Ariz.) "inserted into the Congressional Record a scripted colloquy
... in which Senator Dole reported that the statute was amended 'to delete.., all provisions dealing
with the Durrett issue."' Verna, 58 B.R. at 250. In this colloquy, Senator Dole stated,
Consequently, no provision of the bankruptcy bill as passed by the this body was intended
to intimate any view one way or the other regarding the correctness of the position taken by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Durrett case, or regarding the
correctness of the position taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Laiyer's Title Insurance Co. v. Madrid, which reached a contrary result.
Id. (citing 130 CoNG. REC. S13771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dole)) (citations
omitted). Senator DeConcini questioned. "Then I am correct in concluding that parties in bankruptcy
proceedings who seek avoidance of pre-petition foreclosure sales would find no support for their
arguments in these amendments?" Id. at 13772 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Senator Dole responded,
"The Senator's conclusion is correct." Id (statement of Sen. Dole).
In BFP, the dissent also emphasized Congress' inaction, noting that "Congress considered, but did
not enact, an amendment that said precisely what the majority now says the current provision means."
BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1767.
67. 130 CONG. REC. S13771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
68. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1985) [hereinafter UFTA].
69. Carey, supra note 26, at 693794. In his 1994 study of the UFCA and the UFTA, Carey found
that 29 states had adopted variations of the UFTA, while nine states still retain the UFCA. Id. For a
discussion of the UFCA's initial adoption, see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
70. UFTA § 4 provides that "(a) A transfer made.., by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor...
if the debtor made the transfer ... (2) without receiving reasonably equivalent value[.]" U.F.T.A., supra
note 68, at 652-53.
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of value.7' This definition precludes state law challenges to prepetition
foreclosure sales.72
Despite contrary UFTA amendments, the Seventh Circuit endorsed the
use of fraudulent conveyance law to set aside a forced sale.73 In 1988, in
Bundles v. Baker,74 the Seventh Circuit adopted a case-by-case analysis
looking at the "totality of the circumstances."'75 In Bundles, the
debtor-appellant sought to set aside76 foreclosure of his residence.77 The
property, valued at $15,500, was sold for $5,066.80, barely covering the
balance of the mortgage. 7' After refuting both Madrid and Durrett, the
court adopted a middle ground approach, setting aside the foreclosure
sale.79 The Seventh Circuit required that the bankruptcy court examine the
71. In fact, the language of the UFTA is more expansive than that of the Madrid court. UFTA §
3(b) defines "value" as:
(b) For purposes of Sections 4(a)(2) and 5 [the fraudulent transfer provisions], a person gives
a reasonable equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset
pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of
sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a
mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
U.F.T.A., supra note 68, § 3(a), at 650. The Madrid Rule involved a third-party purchaser at a judicial
foreclosure sale. Madrid21 B.R. at 426. The UFTA uses "person" broadly, granting mortgagees as well
as third-party purchasers an irrebuttable presumption of adequate value. U.F.T.A., supra note 68, § 3(a),
at 650. Further, the UFTA extends this presumption to involuntary transfers by means of the
non-judicial power of sale agreements and Article 9 security interests. Id. § 3(b). Thus, the UFTA
protects more transactions from challenge under state fraudulent transfer law.
72. Id.
73. Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 824. Many other courts have utilized variations of the case-by-case analysis. See, e.g.,
In re Littleton, 888 F.2d 90, 92-94 (1Ith Cir. 1989) (refusing to set aside nonjudicial foreclosure sale
of debtor's residence that realized 63A9% of the fair market value); In re Bates, 32 B.R. 40 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1983) (avoiding forced sale of debtor's residence for 5 percent of fair market value); In re
Richard, 26 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983) (avoiding forced sale of debtor's residence for less than one
percent of debtor's equity).
76. Under § 522(h), a debtor may file a motion asking the court to set aside the foreclosure.
Section 522(h) provides:
(h) The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to the extent
that the debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (g)(l) of this section if
the trustee had avoided such transfer, if-
(1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or
724(a) of this title or recoverable by the trustee under section 553 of this title; and
(2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.
11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (1994).
77. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 817.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 824.
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"foreclosure transaction in its totality"8 by focusing on the property's fair
market value and determining how the foreclosure affected this value."
The Seventh Circuit admonished the district court for using the actual
intent to defraud requirement.8 2 The court noted that the focus in bank-
ruptcy law has shifted from subjective intent to objective results.8 3 Further,
the Bundles court found that § 548,"makes no distinction between sales that
do and sales that do not comply with state law. If we take the statute at
face value, we must conclude that its unambiguous language requires the
reviewing court to make an independent assessment of whether reasonable
equivalence was given. 84 The Bundles court declined to consider the
policy implications of its holding. The court concluded that Congress,
not the judiciary, is the proper forum for changing bankruptcy laws.86 The
Bundles court contended that granting an irrebuttable presumption of
reasonableness improperly engrafted a good faith requirement onto
§ 548(a)(2)(A).8" The Bundles court also found that the Madrid Rule
"renders section 548(a)(2) merely duplicative of other Code provisions."88
Finally, several courts have applied a "commercial reasonableness"
standard in adjudicating fraudulent transfer challenges under § 548.89 The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted
this novel standard in In re General Industries, Inc.9" In General Indus-
80. The court considered many factors, including:
whether the [foreclosure] procedures were calculated not only to secure for the mortgagee the
value of its interest but also to return the debtor-mortgagor his equity in the property....
whether there was a fair appraisal of the property, whether the property was advertised
widely, and whether competitive bidding was encouraged.
856 F.2d at 824.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 823.
83. Id. at 818.
84. Id. at 821.
85. Id. at 823.
86. The court noted:
[i]t is beyond our scope of review to consider the policy implications of permitting the debtor
to set aside the foreclosure of his home. Any change deemed desirable on policy grounds
should be addressed to Congress rather than this court. Our duty is to simply interpret the




89. See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 98 B.R. 983, 992-93 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (setting aside a deed of
trust foreclosure sale under commercial reasonableness standard); In re General Industries, Inc., 79 B.R.
124, 134 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (holding that a sale price constituting only 53% of the property's
value did not establish a "reasonably equivalent value").
90. 79 B.R 124 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
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tries, the Chapter 11 Creditor's Committee brought an action to set aside
a real property prepetition foreclosure for fifty-three percent of the fair
market value.9" The court examined Massachusetts state foreclosure
procedures and concluded that they were "inherently ineffective in
producing equivalent value."92 Thus, the court found the Madrid Rule
inappropriate because it shielded all foreclosure sales from fraudulent
transfer attack.93 The court also rejected the Durrett Rule because it
improperly equated value with sale price, rather than focusing on whether
the sale process was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.94
In adopting the commercial reasonableness standard, the court emphasized
the reasonableness of the "sales efforts made rather than the price achieved.""5
91. 79 B.1. at 127, 129. In General Industries, the real property was a manufacturing plant with
a fair market value of $90,000. Id. at 129. The mortgagee bid the amount of the mortgage, plus
taxes-a sum of $36,952.16. Id. at 127. The mortgagee asserted that the possibility of environmental
damage should be considered when determining the value of the property. Id. However, the court
refused to speculate on such damages. Id.
In addition to the real property issue, the court in General Industries considered what constitutes
reasonably equivalent value for personal property under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In General Industries, the Creditor's Committee objected to the foreclosure of business equipment,
valued at $20,000, for $5,000-only 25% of the fair market value. Id. at 127. The court applied the
commercial reasonableness standard set forth in U.C.C. § 9-504(3) and concluded that the transfer had
not yielded a reasonably equivalent value. Id. at 131, 134.
92. Id. at 132. Emphasizing the lackluster statutory notice requirements under state foreclosure law,
the court stated "the Massachusetts procedural requirements for real estate foreclosure are too minimal
to control the question of reasonably equivalent value under § 548." Id.
93. Id. at 131. The court identified three prongs to the Madrid argument: (1) that fraudulent
transfer law is intended to address debtor's conduct; (2) that state foreclosure procedures provide debtors
and creditors with ample protection; and (3) that set aside will chill the foreclosure and mortgage
lending markets. Id. The court critiqued this three-pronged argument:
All of these arguments have a common flaw: they assume that state foreclosure procedures
are designed to attract bidders and to bring the highest price possible under the circumstances
for real property. Quite often the opposite is true. Most state real estate foreclosure laws
require little in the way of advertising or other promotional efforts, regardless of whether or
not sales are judicially supervised.
Id. at 131-32.
94. Id. at 130-31.
95. See also In re Lindsay, 98 B.R. 983 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989). In Lindsay, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California adopted the General Industries commercial
reasonableness standard. Id. Lindsay involved a fraudulent transfer attack upon a Texas real estate
foreclosure for 64% of the fair market value. Id. at 992. Finding ambiguity in Ninth Circuit law, the
court adopted a commercial reasonableness standard that "examine[s] the price obtained at a foreclosure
sale only when we are persuaded that the foreclosing creditor failed to take commercially reasonable
efforts to achieve the best price." Id. at 990. The court utilized a three part inquiry:
(1) whether the foreclosure sale was properly conducted; (2) whether the totality of the
circumstance indicate that commercially reasonable steps were taken to achieve the best price
at the foreclosure; and (3) whether a lack of commercial reasonableness had a negative effect
of the price achieved.
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III. BFP AND THE IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION RULE
A. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
In 1994, in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,96 the Supreme Court
rejected the use of fraudulent conveyance law to set aside a foreclosure
sale.97 The Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Madrid.9 In
BFP, the Chapter 11 debtor9 petitioned the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of California to set aside a prepetition
foreclosure sale of a beachfront estate. 00 The property, worth in excess
of $725,000, was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to a third-party
purchaser t"' for $433,000, or approximately sixty percent of the fair
market value. 0 2 The Court0 3 concluded that the price received at a
noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale irrefutably constitutes
Id. Lindsay sets forth the backdrop for the Ninth Circuit's BFP opinion.
96. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
97. Id. Compare Kenneth M. Block & Jeffrey B. Steiner, Ending The Threat Of "Durrett:" BFP
Settles Application Of Fraudulent Transfer To Foreclosures, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1994, at 5 (arguing that
BFP settles the dispute over the use of fraudulent conveyance law) with Johnny L. Woodruff, Certiorari
to In re BFP: The Eve of Decision to a Dozen Years of Durrett Conflict-Will Resolution of the Issue
Solve the Real Problem?, 24 MENI. ST. U. L. Rev. 773 (1994) (arguing that because reform of the state
foreclosure process is necessary to resolve the Durrett conflict any decision by the Supreme Court will
be irrelevant).
98. For a discussion of the Madrid Rule, see supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
99. The debtor in BFP was a three-member partnership formed for the purpose of purchasing the
Newport Beach property. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1759. The partnership, comprised of Wayne and Marlene
Pedersen and Russell Barton, arranged with the subsequent owners, the Foremans, to purchase the home
for $356,250, plus some rare coins. BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n, 974 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir.
1992). The Pedersens granted Barton an 180 day option to purchase the home in exchange for Barton's
promise pay the Pedersens 25% of the profits from resale. Id. This peculiar arrangement was riddled
with well-founded allegations of fraud. The Pedersens, under investigation for fraudulent sales of rare
coins, conveyed the property twice, once to the partnership and again to an entity called "Off Road
Vehicles-Recreation and Family Campground." Id. Ultimately, these actions lead to a quiet title
judgment in favor of the Foremans. Id. at 1145-46. However, because the Ninth Circuit held that BFP
"did indeed have a property interest in the Foreman home at the time of Imperial's foreclosure sale,"
the court found BFP the proper party to challenge the sale. Id. at 1147-48.
100. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1759.
101. The bankruptcy court determined that the third-party purchaser, Osborne, was a bona fide
purchaser for value, without notice. Id.
102. Id.
103. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, which consisted of Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens and Ginsberg. Id. at 1767.
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reasonably equivalent value."4
The Court could not locate a clear definition of "reasonably equivalent
value" within the Code and therefore, deferred to state law.' The
majority considered three possible interpretations of "reasonably equivalent
value": fair market value, reasonable forced-sale price, and foreclosure sale
price."' Ultimately, the Court defined "reasonably equivalent value" as
the price actually received at the foreclosure sale.'0 7 The Court reasoned
that a per se validity rule avoids judicial interference with state regulation
and inappropriate judicial policy determinations.' Further, the Court
determined that granting an irrebuttable presumption prevents judicial
disruption of stable and secure real property titles. 9
The Court rejected fair market value because it "has no applicability in
the forced sale context."" 0 It further asserted that fair market value
cannot be the standard in the foreclosure sale context because of the
"strictures of state-prescribed foreclosure."1 " The Court also rejected the
reasonable foreclosure sale price proffered in Bundles, because defining
"reasonable" would require policy judgments that would inappropriately
extend federal bankruptcy law into an area of state regulation."'
Finally, the Court suggested that its holding did not render § 548
superfluous."' The majority asserted that reasonably equivalent value
"will continue to have independent meaning (ordinarily a meaning similar
to fair market value) outside the foreclosure context."'1 4 The Court
explained that its interpretation of reasonably equivalent value only applies
to real estate foreclosures, indicating that "considerations bearing upon
other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may
be different.""' 5 The Court asserted that such a legal interpretation did not
create two different and inconsistent meanings or carve out a foreclosure
104. 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
105. Id. at 1766.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1767. The Court emphasized that "[a]ny irregularity ... that would permit judicial
invalidation of the sale under applicable state law deprives the sale price of its conclusive force under
§ 548(a)(2)(A)." Id. at 1765.
108. Id. at 1761-62.
109. Id. at 1758.
110. Id. at 1761.
I11. Id. at 1762.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1765 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 1761 n.3.
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sale exception to § 548.216 The Court reasoned that the real estate
foreclosure construct has "altered reality," replacing the rules of free-market
exchange with more restrictive rules governing state foreclosure sales.' 1 7
B. Analysis
The majority's logic alters reality. The Court asserts that it is not creating
a real estate foreclosure sale exception, but that is exactly what it has done.
Creating a distinct legal interpretation of "reasonably equivalent value" in
the foreclosure context is judicial innovation at its worst."' BFP's holding
creates a "foreclosure-sale exemption" to the trustee's avoidance powers in
derogation of congressional intent.19 Further, BFP renders § 548(a)(2)(A)
superfluous and restricts the bankruptcy courts' review to a checklist of
state foreclosure procedure. 121
Furthermore, the Court uses circular logic. First, the Court determined
that state foreclosure processes do not yield fair market value and therefore,
bankruptcy courts should just defer to such inadequacy.12' Second, the
Court implies that because § 548 interferes with state property law, this
provision should be excised from the Code. Third, the Court found that
§ 548 interferes with secure title to real property and thus, determined that
116. 114 S. Ct. at 1767.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1771 (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 765 (1993)).
The dissent notes the "common rule of construction calls for a single definition of a common term
occurring in several places within a statute." Id. Appalled by the majority's novel statutory interpreta-
tion, Justice Souter declared that "to give a single term two different and inconsistent meanings (one
procedural, one substantive) for a single occurrence is an offense so unlikely that no common
prohibition has ever been thought necessary to guard against it." Id.
119. For a discussion of§ 548's development, see supra notes 22-33, 60-67 and accompanying text.
120. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied BFP
in In re Barr, 170 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994). In Barr, a foreclosing lender purchased land worth
approximately $156,000 for a bid of approximately $72,000, including assumed mortgages. Id. at 773-
74. The court did not analyze the sale pursuant to § 548. Instead, citing BFP, the court reasoned that
"the disposition of the case depends on whether the foreclosure sale sub judice was accordant
procedurally and substantively with applicable South Carolina state foreclosure law." Id. at 776. The
Bankruptcy Court concluded that under South Carolina law, "inadequacy of price was not 'so gross as
to shock the conscience."' Id. at 777 (citation omitted).
Barr exemplifies BFP's impact on § 548. If the debtor had brought a state court action, the court's
analysis would not differ. BFP completely guts § 548(a)(2)(A). The courts are now powerless to review
cases such as Barr.
Furthermore, the state standard of price inadequacy---"so gross as to shock the conscience"-is not
even analogous to the concept of reasonably equivalent value. See supra note 20. Equating the two is
absurd.
121. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
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it should not be applied to real property transfers.'22
Having identified tensions between bankruptcy and state law, the Court
errs by following state law without any deference to federal policy or the
Code's straightforward import. In carving out an exception for real property
foreclosures, the majority suggests that "the 'important' policy favoring
security of title should count more and the 'important' bankruptcy policies
should count less."'" This rationale is illogical and unprecedented. The
majority circumvents the statute's straightforward language' 24 to the benefit
of the mortgage lending community and the real estate bar.
The majority criticizes the use of fraudulent conveyance law in the
foreclosure sale context as a radical interference with state regulation. 2 '
However, such interference is not uncommon or inappropriate. 26 For
example, the Code commonly interferes with state regulation of tort law
and criminal restitution.'27 Similarly, the Code permits the TIB to set
aside transfers consummated within ninety days of filing as preferential
transfers. 21 Yet, the Court has not carved out an exception for preferen-
tial transfers. Interference with state interests constitutes an essential
component of the bankruptcy system-allowing the TIB to recapture
improvidently transferred assets for the benefit of the estate. 29
122. 114 S. Ct. at 1758.
123. Id. at 1777 (Souter, J., dissenting opinion).
124. Id. at 1766-67. In fact, Justice Scalia interprets "reasonably equivalent value" as ambiguous
language. Id. at 1766. However, Scalia engrafts policy issues upon the statute before analyzing the
language. He argues that the "highly generalized reformulation of the 'plain meaning' of reasonably
equivalent value' continues to leave unanswered the one question central to this case, wherein the
ambiguity lies: lfhat is the foreclosed property worth?" Id. (emphasis added). Scalia recognizes that
fair market value is the widely accepted benchmark for determining reasonably equivalent value, but
he refuses to apply it to real property foreclosures. Under § 548, it is clear that the value of foreclosed
property equals fair market value. Scalia's argument constitutes artful dodging rather than sound legal
reasoning.
125. Id. at 1766-67.
126. The dissent indicates that "[the Court has], on many prior occasions, refused to depart from
plain Code meaning in spite of arguments that doing so would vindicate.., equally 'importint' state
interests." Id. at 1776 (citations omitted).
127. See, e.g., In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1989) (discharging debtor's state law
intentional tort judgment); Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (discharging
Chapter 13 debtor's criminal restitution for welfare fraud); see also BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1777 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (noting how federal bankruptcy law already preempts state domestic relations law by
allowing TIBs to set aside transfers by marital dissolution decree).
128. Under § 547 of the Code, the TIB may avoid preferential transfers incurred by the debtor
within 90 days of her bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1993). For a discussion of the TIB
avoidance powers, see supra note 10.
129. For a discussion of the TIB avoidance powers, see supra note 10.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/8
A PALACE FOR A PEPPERCORN
The BFP decision shifts the emphasis away from preservation of the
bankruptcy estate, and forces rigid adherence to state foreclosure law,
which is outdated, ineffective and overly formalistic. 30 BFP equates
reasonably equivalent value with state fraudulent conveyance standards,
which require only that the price be "so gross as to shock the con-
science."'' It is absurd to equate these standards.
Blind deference to state procedure prevents equal distribution of the
estate as mandated by the Code.'32 By granting procedural compliance
per se validity, the Court engrafts a good faith presumption upon the
foreclosing mortgagee in direct opposition to the purpose of § 548.'
BFP deprives the bankruptcy estate, junior lienors, and unsecured creditors
of the value of the foreclosed property and effectively legalizes construc-
tively fraudulent transfers.
IV. PROPOSALS
The judicial legalization of constructively fraudulent conveyances is a
victory for the mortgage lending community. Although bothered by the
absence of "clearer textual guidance" on what constitutes reasonably
equivalent value, the BFP Court crafted a foreclosure sale exception
supported solely by policy arguments. 34 Nothing in § 548(a) or its
legislative history supports the outcome in BFP.35 Nor does the Code
require compliance with state law.'36 In fact, Congress explicitly rejected
the irrebuttable presumption rule during the 1984 BAFJA debates.137 The
BFP dissent aptly noted that "Congress, and not this Court, is the
130. For a discussion of the structural inadequacies of state foreclosure law, see supra note 18.
131. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1775 n. 16 (citations omitted). The majority discusses "black letter" state
foreclosure law, stating:
When these [state] procedures have been followed, however, it is "black letter" law that mere
inadequacy of the foreclosure price is no basis for setting the sale aside, though it may be set
aside (under state foreclosure law, rather than fraudulent transfer law) if the price is so low
as to "shock the conscience or raise a presumption of fraud or unfairness."
Id. at 1763-64 (citations omitted).
132. For a discussion of the bankruptcy goal of equitable distribution, see supra note 7.
133. For a discussion of the removal of the good faith requirement, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
134. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1764.
135. For the text of § 548(a), see supra note 5. For a discussion of § 548's legislative history, see
supra notes 22-33, 60-67 and accompanying text.
136. See Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d at 821.
137. For a discussion of the impact of BAFJA on the Durrett/Madrid conflict, see supra notes 61-
68 and accompanying text.
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appropriate body" to make such policy determinations.'38
Application of BFP clarifies the need for a legislative response to this
statutory derogation. Suppose you are counsel representing a junior lienor,
Second National Bank ("SNB"), on the commercial real estate discussed at
the outset of this Note. The fair market value of the property is one million
dollars. SNB holds a $50,000 second mortgage on the property. ONB is
foreclosing the first mortgage of $500,000 in a judicial sale conducted
under state law.
At the properly conducted public sale, ONB is the high bidder and
purchases the property for $500,000. The sale discharges all subsequent
liens including SNB's second mortgage. One month later, ONB resells the
asset under commercially reasonable terms for one million dollars and
captures $500,000 of the debtor's equity. May SNB challenge the adequacy
of the sale?
Under BFP, so long as ONB complies with state law governing the
foreclosure procedure, SNB is powerless to upset the sale.'39 BFP renders
bankruptcy courts powerless to review the sale process and equates
reasonably equivalent value with the price actually received. Ultimately,
ONB pockets $500,000 of equity as a windfall, and SNB, as well as the
estate, receives nothing.
To prevent such estate depletions, Congress should amend § 548 to allow
bankruptcy courts to review foreclosure sale transfers. Congress should
create a definition of reasonably equivalent value that establishes fair
market value as the benchmark, without designating a percentile cut-off, as
in Durrett.140
In order to apply this definition of reasonably equivalent value, Congress
138. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1777.
139. Conceivably, SNB could bring a state action. However, under state law, price inadequacy alone
is not sufficient to void a sale. Absent other factors, SNB would not prevail. See supra note 18 (setting
forth the state avoidance standards).
140. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1980). See also William H.
Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures: Some
Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1985). Written immediately after Madrid and BAFJA,
Professor Henning's proposal stands alone in its support of Durrett. Henning encourages parties to use
fraudulent conveyance law to set aside inadequate real property foreclosure sales. Id. at 284-85.
However, Henning opposes the 70% benchmark. Id. at 285. Henning proposes significant limitations
on Durrett's application, such as: a three month rather than the one year avoidance period; a nine month
statute of limitations; limited monetary rewards; a provision protecting good faith purchasers of
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should include a provision incorporating the Bundles case-by-case rule. 4 '
hi. tule -hould require bankruptcy courts to conduct evidentiary hearings
on prepetition foreclosures when a transfer deprives the bankruptcy estate
of the approximate fair market value.
Incorporating the rationale of General Industries,'42 courts should
measure such deprivation by analyzing the sale process and the diminution
of the debtor's equity. The fact-specific test for reasonably equivalent value
should be whether or not the foreclosing lender took commercially
reasonable'43 steps to preserve the debtor's equity in the property.
Alternatively, courts should narrowly construe BFP. BFP should only
apply where there is a third party purchaser or a bona fide purchaser for
volue. Where the foreclosing lender is also the purchaser, there should be
a higher level of judicial scrutiny. At most, foreclosing lenders should be
given a rebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value.'"
Finally, BFP should be limited to real estate foreclosures. 4 Courts
141. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824. See also supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text (discussing
Budles).
142. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing the commercial reasonableness
143. Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") requires that a secured party
dipos, of collateral in a "commercially reasonable" manner. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1993). However, the
LICC do s not define "commercially reasonable," acknowledging that such an issue is fact specific. Id.
at § 9-504(3) (c. 1).
144. Alden, supra note 47, at 1624. In his analysis of Durrett, Alden concluded: "In order to
hbarmonize the distinct policies underlying foreclosure and fraudulent conveyance laws, the courts should
considcr awarding an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value to a third-party purchaser
while granting no more than a rebuttable presumption to the mortgagee which bids in its debt." Id.
145. Despite the argument that bankruptcy law should not interfere with the Uniform Commercial
Code, many courts have applied the § 548 analysis to foreclosures of personal property under U.C.C.
§ 9-504. See Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 960 F.2d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Chapter
7 TI8's § 54(a)(2) challenge to the fraudulent conveyance of a collections guarantee); In re Jeffrey
Bj 2 lowv Design Group, 956 F.2d 479, 485 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying a depletion-of-the-estate test to
payronts fraudulently conveyed under a line of credit); In re Morris Communications, 914 F.2d 458,
424-45 (4th Cir. 1990) (challenging allegedly fraudulent transfer of stock in partnership); In re Roco
Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 984-85 (lst Cir. 1983) (challenging redemption of corporate stock and note given
a. j -ecurity interest in a constructively fraudulent conveyance); In re Royal Coach Country, 125 B.R.
665, 674 (Banrl. M.D. Fla. 1991) (setting aside foreclosure of a used car for less than reasonably
yqLivalcnt value, which the court equated with fair market value in the used car market); In re Corp.
.1t Aviation, 57 B.R. 195, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (rejecting application of Durrett in stock sale);
In r: Join-in Int'l, 56 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying a reasonableness test to the bulk
trarisfcr of invcntory challenged as a fraudulent conveyance).
Similar policy arguments can be made for the application of BFP to personal property sales under
Article Nine of the UCC. Henning, supra note 140, at 278. However, the majority specifically limits
J3FP to real property foreclosures. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765. See also supra note 112 and accompanying
t t. One court followed this limiting language. In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, 1994 WL 575445
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applying a per se validity rule to the foreclosure of personal property would
further derogate congressional intent by creating another judicial exception
where no statutory distinction exists. Under § 548 courts should continue
to review personal property foreclosures that fail to yield reasonably
equivalent value. 4
6
Under the first proposed amendment, the junior lienor in our hypotheti-
cal, SNB, could challenge the adequacy of the foreclosure sale. The
bankruptcy court would conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the parties conducted the sale in a commercially reasonable
manner. If the court determines the sale was not commercially reasonable,
ONB would be forced to reconduct the foreclosure sale, obtain a sale price
reasonably equivalent to the fair market value, and allow the bankruptcy
estate to recapture the surplus equity.
Under the second proposal, a narrow interpretation of BFP, SNB could
still challenge the sale's adequacy because ONB is the foreclosing lender
and the purchaser. The court would only grant a rebuttable presumption of
equivalent value. Thus, ONB would have the burden of proving the sale
was commercially reasonable.
However, the second proposal does not rectify price inadequacies when
a bona fide third party purchases the property. Further, administering the
implementation of a narrow judicial interpretation would be much more
difficult. For these reasons, a congressional amendment is the best solution
to the BFP problem.
The proposed amendments provide the bankruptcy court with flexibility
to determine when circumstances require review of state procedures. Not
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994). In Pajaro Dunes, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of California refused to apply BFP to a Chapter I I debtor's challenge to the satisfaction of a $1 million
note for $541,895.55. Id. at 30. The court recognized that "neither the majority nor the dissent [in BFP]
outlined any benchmarks... as to what [reasonably equivalent value] should normally be." Id. at 30.
However, the court concluded that it need not choose between the Durrett Rule or the Bundles Rule
because under either rule "PDRA's receipt of $541,895.55 in value in return for its one million dollar
obligation... would not be held as reasonably equivalent." Id.
Pajaro Dunes exemplifies the inconsistencies in BFP. Why should courts scrutinize real property
foreclosures less stringently than personalty foreclosures? Why is reasonably equivalent value not
applicable inside the foreclosure context? The majority fails to answer these questions.
146. One commentator argues that because "personal property sold in a commercially reasonable
manner obtains reasonably equivalent value with no more certainty than real property sold in accordance
with state foreclosure laws, sales pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-504 should be no less subject to scrutiny
under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code." Alden, supra note 47, at 1624.
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all state foreclosure statutes are inadequate. 47 Not all sales necessitate
review. However, when state law is particularly deficient, judicial
intervention by the federal bankruptcy courts is appropriate.
Further, given the diverse nature of real property, the case-by-case
evidentiary review is essential. In order to determine whether the procedure
was commercially reasonable, the courts must examine the unique
characteristics of the collateral. Courts should consider factors such as use,
location, and surrounding market. Additionally, an evidentiary hearing is
necessary to preserve the assets of the estate.
The proposed amendments to § 548 rectify state law inadequacies where
necessary. Section 548's purpose is not to preempt state procedure or to
impose federal reform of the state foreclosure system. The structural
deficiencies in the state foreclosure system will not be solved via federal
bankruptcy law. However, the proposed amendments provide a means for
challenging those sales which comply with state procedure but contradict
federal bankruptcy policy.
V. CONCLUSION
BFP legalizes constructively fraudulent conveyances, leaving the
bankruptcy courts powerless to preserve the assets of the estate from over-
zealous creditors. The use of fraudulent transfer law to set aside irregular
foreclosure sales furthers federal bankruptcy policy.14 If state foreclosure
laws are so inadequate as to "alter[] reality,"'49 the courts must be allowed
to review and set aside such transfers. Bankruptcy courts must be allowed
to review foreclosure sales when such sales result in an unjust diminution
of the bankruptcy estate. Congress did not intend to allow mortgagees to
purchase palaces (valuable real estate) for a "peppercorn."' 0 Adoption of
these amendments will resurrect § 548(a)(2)(A), allowing TIBs, unsecured
creditors, and debtors to recapture equity lost to the improvident state
foreclosure process.
147. See Woodruff, supra note 97, at 798. Woodruff suggests that the Illinois foreclosure
procedures, modeled after the Uniform Land Transaction Act, adequately address the common
deficiencies of the state system. Id.
148. See supra notes 26-65 and accompanying text (discussing federal bankruptcy policy).
149. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1767. Justice Scalia notes that "[ulnlike most other legal restrictions,
however, foreclosure has the effect of completely redefining the market." He then concludes that
"[g]iven this altered reality, and the concomitant inutility of the normal tool for determining what
property is worth (fair market value), the only legitimate evidence of the property's value ... is the
foreclosure sale price itself." Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 1767. See supra note 19.
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By amending the Code to define reasonably equivalent value as proposed
in Part IV, Congress would provide TIBs with a useful tool to preserve the
assets of the estate. Allowing the bankruptcy courts to review and set aside
state foreclosures via federal fraudulent transfer law is an effective and
beneficial method of ensuring the equitable distribution of the debtor's
assets.
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